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Fight & Flight: Steve Elson replies
SAN DIEGO WEEKLY READER A reply to Fight & Flight by Steve Elson POSTED OCTOBER 22, 2001---NEW ORLEANS- When I first saw the pictures on the front page of the Reader I was struck by the fact that Mr. Flynn looked very official, very pensive, and very much like a man who should be in charge of a corporation. I, on the other hand, had my eyes mostly closed and was looking down. When I showed the paper to some friends, inevitably the first question was, “Why are your eyes closed and why do you look so sad, so ‘beaten up’?” Reflecting a moment, I stated that I was emotionally drained, that a ferocious battle between despondence and rage was taking place inside of me, and that I was perhaps reflecting on some very quick, easy, and inexpensive measures Mr. Flynn could have taken to dramatically reduce the likelihood of a successful air terrorism event - if only he had cared and listened to the many good Special Agents in the FAA. But, he didn’t and now 6,500+ bodies of innocent men, women, and children are burned forever into our memories. I was reflecting on days past when I held ADM Flynn in high esteem for his personal integrity and how he gave it over to the FAA Cult at the expense of the lives of the flying public entrusted to him during his tenure as head of FAA “Security.” He broke his Oath; he broke the faith! The most basic/absolutely essential elements in aviation security are Not technology, Not money, but People -- Properly selected, well-trained, highly motivated, inspirationally led, and closely supervised people. It is that simple, that easy, and that cheap. I am one of the most fortunate people in the country for I have worked with the best people in the Country – my Teammates in the SEAL Teams. I have friends in or have worked with virtually every major law enforcement and intelligence organization in our Country. Not a single one of them has the overall quality/motivation/dedication of people that I worked with in the SEALs, particularly the Enlisted SEALs. Mr. Flynn had this same opportunity but apparently failed to learn from the Teams. I learned so much as an enlisted man working for the Chiefs and Petty Officers in the SEAL Teams; I probably learned even more as an officer “working for” the Chiefs and Petty Officers in the SEAL teams. Thank you, gentlemen. That’s why I know I have a good feel for People and what one can do with People. I know that people form the solid foundation needed to enhance security. Then technology is merely an adjunct to those people. Many “experts” and elected officials tend to be derisive of Security Checkpoint Screeners. Checkpoint Screeners in the end are “just people,” and like other “populations” in the Country have mostly good, decent, people simply looking for leadership and a chance to contribute. One of the big problems in FAA Civil Aviation Security is that most people in the organization know nothing about security. FAA management tends to confuse law enforcement with security; they are NOT the same thing. FAA Special Agents go to school, not to learn security, but to learn security regulations and administrivia. In Mr. Flynn’s own words, “FAA Security is not a security force but a regulator of security.” I agree. But how can FAA “security” personnel regulate something they have never been taught, are discouraged from learning, and for which they are punished when “thinking outside the box?” They can’t! In order to effect and regulate good security, one must understand security concepts. In his own words in the article, Mr. Flynn made it abundantly clear that he does not understand security concepts. Two comments by Mr. Flynn in the article are particularly instructive: He (Mr. Flynn) said “he simply could not have been expected to foresee the chain of events that has plunged us into a national crisis,” and “Flynn said the FAA conducted such (brainstorming) session, but again, nobody envisioned the extraordinary facts of the terrible events: maniacal terrorists armed only with knives and box cutters…” (Perhaps Mr. Flynn was too busy, in his own words, “whiling away the time” with his Swiss Army Knife at that brainstorming session to envision any disaster.) It was not necessary for Mr. Flynn and his staff to envision the results of this “terrible event.” It was his job only to “envision” keeping bombs and hijackers off the planes. That’s all. The results matter not from an FAA Security perspective. Had he merely tried to keep bombs, weapons, and hijackers off the plane, the results might never have occurred. Ergo, his comment is a non sequitur. Once the hijacking had taken place and the terrorists had control of the plane, FAA “Security” had already failed, irrespective of whether the terrorists had gone for a joyride, landed, gone to Cuba, or crashed the plane into a building. It seems to me that Mr. Flynn, like much of the public, looks at the security screening checkpoint as security. The checkpoint is only one small, discrete part of a much greater and all encompassing security system. In my estimation, Civil Aviation Security should begin that system at a point some 5,000’ above the altitude that a shoulder-fired missile can bring the plane down. That system goes all the way to the ground and then literally everything from outside an airport perimeter must be part of that system, e.g., the airport physical plant, the runways, the terminal, the parking garages, the curbside check-in, the check-in area, the screening checkpoint, the halls, the gate desks, the jetway doors, the airplane, the wheelwells of the airplane, the cabin of the airplane, the cockpit of the airplane, the lav in the airplane, caterers, all service personnel, pilots, passengers, CNN Airport TV, all employees, all equipment, all facilities, etc. Security should be focused around the target – the airplane, be it passenger or cargo. Security has to follow a “defense in depth” concept or concentric circles (or more accurately polygons) around the airplane. Nominally this is done; realistically the main focus seems to be solely on the screening checkpoint. I see FAA security responsibilities ending, in the case of a hijacking, only when the hijackers have control of the cockpit/controls. There are many options that flight crews have at hand to defeat a terrorist or other miscreant. FAA Agents and pilots have addressed these issues for years. It appears that no one heard or cared. I believe Mr. Flynn’s contention that in the FAA staff “brainstorming” sessions “nobody envisioned the extraordinary facts of the terrible events” is probably true. That is because his staff had absolutely no clue about security concepts and is dedicated to the FAA managements cult’s core “values” of self-aggrandizement, personal profiteering, and above all protecting management no matter the cost -- even the horrific loss of life as we now see at the WTC. But – there are many Agents in the field and some senior headquarters personnel who knew that there was only a Civil Aviation façade of security. Mr. Flynn ignored them or allowed them to be abused and threatened. The FAA Agents job became to protect h is/her back, not to promote Civil Aviation Security. If Mr. Flynn had listened to his field agents and followed all FAA and DoT guidance (ACS Campaign Plan, FAA Strategic Plan, Model Workplace 2000, FAA Values) on how to treat employees (give them the tools and let them do their jobs), maybe, just maybe, we could have thwarted the events of 11Sep01. Maybe there was no way to stop the hijacking; maybe we could have stopped one, two, three, or all the hijackings. We will never know because we (the field agents) were never given the chance to “do our jobs.” Instead Flynn supported oppressive and ignorant managers such as Joanne Oxford in Houston and Mary Carol Turano in Boston (each still in FAA “Security” and making over $100,000/yr). Mr. Flynn knew how bad these managers were from turnover rates in these offices, FAA 2000 Employee Attitude surveys, and near total lack of security at their airports. This is objective information and a matter of record. Thus in covering up and protecting these managers, not listening to his troops, and supporting abuse of employees trying to make a difference, Mr. Flynn was indeed an anathema to Civil Aviation Security. One quick vignette is instructive here. Interestingly enough, the “knife” has played the prominent role in recent events. In the 19Feb01 “USNEWS” article, Jim Morris described me walking through a security screening checkpoint several times with a “hunting” knife. It did not set off the metal detector and I forgot I had the knife. Mr. Flynn knew this very knife did not alarm the metal detectors because shortly after taking over as head of FAA Security he went through the screening checkpoint at Dulles and commented to one of the FAA Agents accompanying him that screening seemed pretty good. That Agent then whipped out the same model of knife I had. When I assisted the FOX 25 Undercover News reporter on the assessments she did at Boston Logan in April of this year, a leatherman tool (with knife blade) made it through the checkpoints every time. And then the hijacking featured boxcutters/knives. Now the government wants FAMs (Federal Air Marshals) on flights to deal with such issues. Here is a small excerpt from a FAM on Mr. Flynn’s guidance to a FAM team when discussing, knives, Rules of Engagement and use of deadly force: “So anyway, Flynn walks in while we're watching a film of a guy that stands up in the aisle of a plane brandishing a large knife (like a Bowie knife or butcher knife). He's yelling and screaming some nonsense about dying for his maker and slashing at people as he starts walking down the aisle. One of the FAMs asks Flynn, "At what point can we shoot this guy?" and Flynn states (and I quote exactly, as his comment is seared into my memory), "Well, the point at which you could draw and shoot is when he initiates his downward thrust with the knife". Mr. Flynn mentions the many e-mails and letters I wrote to the White House, SECDoT, Congress, FAA, and at one point in the article says, “Steve is nuts.” He confuses “nuts” with frustration and concern. What he didn’t mention is that I addressed virtually all these problems (and proffered solutions) up the chain of command while in the FAA. People laugh when I say I am not one of the world’s more patient people. But I was patient. I worked inside the chain of command long after I left the FAA. I repeatedly pled for someone to pay attention, because a number of us simply had that “gut” feeling about an impending disaster. My “strident” writings were not always so. They became more strident as I became more panicky that “something” terrible was going to happen and that it might easily be averted if someone just listened and cared. I twice went to Congress in 2000 taking literally hundreds of pages of well-organized, indexed, sub-indexed, and frightening documentation. Only one Congressional Staffer took action. Sadly, he wasn’t enough. So, Mr. Flynn, if you think I am “nuts” it is because you simply didn’t care, didn’t listen – to me and others trying to tell you so you could “envision” the attack. I pled with you and others to do something when I promised you and Kay Payne that I would go as high as I had to in order to try to prevent a disaster. I even threatened to go to the press, which I never did; they came to me. I told you, DoT, and Congress that the type of material I would have to reveal did not belong in the public domain, but in the end the public had to know IF none of you cared, listened, or took action. None of you did! And you the reader can greatly improve his/her own safety and security by reading analytically, paying attention, and HOLDING YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS ACCOUNTABLE. Those in Congress, DoT, and FAA all took an oath to: “support and defend...well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” The White House and the Congress will remove Jane Garvey and Civil Aviation Security from the FAA if We The People demand it. We only get what we tolerate. Let us do our jobs as citizens. Steve Elson, knowledgeable passenger, disgusted taxpayer, frightened parent. This letter originally appeared in the San Diego Reader, September 27, 2001. Read the story that this letter responds to. |
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